1 (see also Chapter 9) . It may be embedded only in the "fringe" of consciousness, 1 but it is there, nevertheless. Aesthetic response can come into focal consciousness in a variety of circumstances: when the aesthetic response is extreme (e.g., seeing something so wonderful or so terrible that it calls attention to itself on purely aesthetic grounds), when one's attention is directed to aesthetic response by context (e.g., viewing paintings in a museum or shopping for home furnishings in a store), or when one is given explicit instructions to do so (e.g., in the aesthetic ratings tasks researchers give participants in laboratory experiments).
In this chapter we address two principal questions about human aesthetic experience: How are aesthetic responses related to stimulus dimensions, and what causes people to have them in the fi rst place? We will address these issues as concrete, well-defi ned empirical problems that can be approached using the standard tools of scientifi c research: formulating hypotheses about how the visual system works and/or why it works that way, doing experiments designed to test these hypotheses, interpreting the results in light of them, and formulating further hypotheses to be tested in the next iteration of an ongoing hypothesis-testing cycle.
Although we fi nd it fairly obvious that aesthetic response can be studied scientifi cally, others may not. Indeed, some would claim that aesthetic science is not only impossible but oxymoronic, presuming that science and aesthetics are somehow inherently contradictory and incompatible concepts. Science, for example, is supposedly lawful and objective, whereas aesthetics is claimed to be whimsical and subjective. We acknowledge that there is a logical possibility that aesthetic science might fail if there were no systematic commonalities among diff erent people's aesthetic preferences, but this is an empirical issue. Below we report several results that provide signifi cant insights into aesthetic questions using rigorous experimental methods.
Th e two domains we have been studying are aesthetic preferences for color and spatial composition. Other than the fact that color and spatial structure are both visual features potentially relevant to aesthetic response, they seem to have little in common, being distinct aspects of vision that diverge within the visual nervous system right in the retina and appear to stay separated through much of early cortical processing. 2 Nevertheless, aesthetic responses to chromatic and spatial structure seem to have a surprising high-level commonality in that both are strongly infl uenced by implicit statistical knowledge of the observer's ecological niche. Below we review our reasons for coming to this conclusion.
Color Preferences
Most people have relatively strong and pervasive aesthetic preferences among colors. Although such preferences can diff er quite dramatically across individuals, there do appear to be regularities. In modern Western cultures, for example, more people name blue as their favorite color than any other. 3 A century of scientifi c investigation has taught us a great deal about which colors people like, on average, [4] [5] but there has been surprisingly little work on why people like the colors they do. In the fi rst half of this chapter, we describe our attempt to fi ll this gap. Th e answer we propose, which we call the ecological valence theory (or EVT), 6 is relatively straightforward: people like colors to the degree that they like the environmental objects that are that color. If true, the EVT implies that the human brain contains statistical information about the overall aff ective valence (liking to disliking) of interactions with colored objects. Some of this knowledge may come genetically through the evolutionary history of the species, but some of it is surely specifi c to the autobiographical history of the individual. We fi rst describe the EVT in the context of other theories of color preference. We then present experimental results that measure color preferences. Finally, we present data that test the theories, and we argue that the data strongly favor the EVT.
theories of color preference
Given the importance of the question, surprisingly little has been written about why people like the colors they do. Most of the literature on color preference consists of psychophysical experiments that simply describe preferences without explaining them. [7] [8] Th is is, of course, an essential fi rst step in understanding color preferences, but going on to answer the why question is the important next step, which has seldom been taken.
One approach was suggested by Nicholas Humphrey, 9 who proposed that color preferences arise because of the diff erent signals that colors convey to organisms in nature. He argues that colors can send "approach" signals, such as the colors of fl owers that attract pollinating bees, or "avoid" signals, such as the colors of poisonous toads that warn off potential predators. Th e underlying idea is that because colors carry information about which kinds of objects an organism should or should not interact with, it would be benefi cial if the organism "liked" the colors that send approach signals and "disliked" the ones that send avoid signals, as these aesthetic experiences will lead the organism to behave adaptively. Th e bottom line is that the relevance of chromatic information for the organism's health and well-being makes it benefi cial for the organism to behave in accord with such color preferences.
A related idea is proposed in Hurlbert and Ling's evolutionary theory, in which they suggest a neural mechanism for color preferences based on hard-wired, coneopponent responses that arose from natural selection. 10, 11 Th e physiological aspects of their theory are based on well-understood mechanisms in the fi rst few synapses of the human color vision system (see Palmer, pp. 107-121, 12 for a summary). Hurlbert and Ling 13 found that 70 percent of the variance in their preference data could be explained by contrasts between the outputs of these cone-based systems in response to a color relative to its surrounding color. Among their fi ndings was 1 a gender diff erence on which they based their evolutionary hypothesis: females tended to prefer redder colors, whereas males tended to prefer colors that were more blue-green. 14 Hurlbert and Ling 15 attributed this gender diff erence to evolutionary adaptation within prehistoric hunter-gather societies. Th ey conjectured that females like redder colors because their visual systems were selected for fi nding ripe red fruit. Th ey mentioned only this one example, however, and did not speculate on why males might prefer colors that appear more blue-green or why both genders prefer colors that are more blue-violet than those that are more yellow-green. By extrapolation, there should be evolutionarily good reasons for these other preferences as well, depending on which colors are most adaptive for members of the species, but the authors did not elaborate on such matters. Genetic modifi cations would presumably have accrued over an evolutionary time scale such that the members of the species came to be tuned to the most adaptive color preferences, whatever those might be.
Th ere is a variant of this theory that has the same conceptual foundation but is based on a higher-level set of color dimensions. At some (as yet unknown) level of the visual nervous system, the representation of color in humans appears to undergo a transformation into a diff erent set of three dimensions: hue (consisting of red-versus-green and blue-versus-yellow), brightness (how light or dark colors are), and saturation (how intense or vivid colors are). Th is set of dimensions is historically associated with the color theory of Ewald Hering 16 and is most closely aligned in modern times with the Natural Color System specifi ed by Hård and Sivik. 17 We call this theory the "color appearance theory" simply because its dimensions correspond more closely to people's conscious experiences of color appearance than the outputs of the cone systems. 8 Another approach to answering the why question is based on the emotional content of colors. Ou and associates 18, 19 proposed and studied a set of "coloremotions, " which they defi ned as "feelings evoked by either colors or color combinations. " Th ey did not actually propose it as a theory of why people prefer the colors they do, but it can readily be interpreted containing such a theory with a few additional assumptions. Th ey proposed that people's experiences of colors include nine emotion-like dimensions: warm-cool, heavy-light, modern-classical, clean-dirty, active-passive, hard-soft , tense-relaxed, fresh-stale, masculine-feminine . Th ey measured people's responses to colors in terms of these color-emotion dimensions and performed a factor analysis of these data. Sixty-seven percent of the variance in their color preference data could be explained by three factor-analytic dimensions: active-passive (active preferred), heavy-light (light preferred), and warm-cool (cool preferred). Th ey did not speculate on how color-emotions arise nor why some color-emotions predict preferences better than others. It is unclear, for example, why happy-sad was not included as a color-emotional dimension; as perhaps the most evaluatively polarized emotion of all, it would seem to be relevant, but it does not seem to fi t the obvious prediction that happy colors should be well Fig. 8.1C ).
To extend the color-emotion theory to account for why people like the colors they do, one simply needs to assume that people like colors to the degree that they like the color-emotions produced by or consistent with viewing those colors. Because people like active , light , and cool colors better than passive , heavy , and warm ones, this hypothesis predicts that they should also tend to fi nd active , light , and cool feelings more desirable than passive , heavy , and warm feelings. In a small study, we found that the fi rst two dimensions of their three-factor model are appropriately aligned with this prediction, because people do rate active and light feelings as more desirable than passive and heavy ones, but we also found they generally rate warm feelings as more desirable than cool ones, which is inconsistent with the prediction.
Th e EVT that we propose as a framework for understanding color preferences in some sense unites and extends these previous approaches. It is based on both an evolutionary premise that color preferences are fundamentally adaptive and an emotional premise that aff ective valences (positive to negative evaluations of experiences) underlie them. Th e primary diff erence is that the EVT proposes it is not people's responses to the colors themselves that determine preferences, but their aff ective responses to the objects that are those colors.
In general, the EVT posits that people's health and well-being are likely to be improved if they are attracted to things whose colors "look good" to them and avoid things whose colors "look bad" to them. We thus view color preferences as providing a kind of steering mechanism roughly analogous to that provided by taste preferences in eating. Generally speaking, people's health and well-being are likely to be improved if they eat things that "taste good" to them and avoid eating things that "taste bad" to them. Th e rationale is that the tastes people tend to like (e.g., sweet fatty substances) are correlated with high-calorie content and those they tend not to like (e.g., bitter sour substances) are correlated with toxic content. Th e analogous ecological heuristic underlying the EVT will be similarly adaptive if how "good" versus "bad" colors look to people correlates with the degree to which things that characteristically are those colors are advantageous versus disadvantageous to their health and well-being.
Th e EVT makes a clear empirical prediction: average preferences for any given color over a representative sample of people should be highly predictable from average emotional responses (positive to negative) of similar people to the set of correspondingly colored objects. In other words, people should generally like colors associated with objects that tend to elicit positive aff ective reactions (e.g., blues and cyans with positively valued clear sky and clean water) and dislike colors associated with objects that tend to elicit negative reactions (e.g., brown and olive colors with negatively valued biological waste products and rotting food). We test 21 and color-emotions.
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Feedback from color-relevant experiences can infl uence color preferences in at least two ways. First, it could shape genetically based preferences for evolutionarily advantageous colors over evolutionarily disadvantageous ones, as Humphrey (1976) and suggest. Th ese preferences would presumably refl ect universal biases in the ecological statistics of color within the human ecological niche (e.g., blue skies and brown feces). Similar principles might also hold for other species, but we will restrict our attention to people, who are much easier to study. Second, learning mechanisms could tune an organism's color preferences during its own lifetime based on environmental feedback such that it comes to like the colors it has found to be associated with advantageous outcomes and dislike colors it has found to be associated with disadvantageous outcomes. To the extent that people prefer more advantageous outcomes, they should learn to prefer the colors associated with those outcomes.
Th e best evidence for innate color preferences in humans comes from measurements of looking preferences in infants. Researchers measure either how much time infants spent looking at each color in comparison with white during a series of fi xed-duration trials or the percentage of trials on which infants look fi rst at each color in comparison with white. Figure 8 .1A shows data adapted from Teller, Civan, and Bronson-Castain 23 for the fi rst-look preferences of 12-week-old infants viewing pairs of six colors. Th e general shape of this function, with a peak at blue and valley around yellow-green, is surprisingly similar to the average hue preferences we fi nd in adults (Fig. 8.1B ,C) . Although the infant preference function may of course refl ect learning during the fi rst 12 weeks of life, it may also include a strong innate component.
Th e EVT assumes that learning mechanisms modify color preferences from the inborn starting point, leading eventually to adult preference functions that refl ect many diverse infl uences. Th rough interactions with objects in the environment, people learn valences for particular objects depending on the pleasantness/ unpleasantness of their experiences with them. For example, biting into a delicious red apple or diving into a refreshing blue lake should produce an increment of positive aff ect to corresponding red and blue colors, whereas smelling feces or tasting rotten fruit should produce a decrement in positive aff ect to the corresponding brown and olive colors. Colors thus accumulate increments and decrements in aesthetic valence by association with the corresponding objects, such that color preferences come to refl ect the overall desirability of things associated with that color.
Th e EVT implies several levels at which environmental factors might infl uence color preferences. First, average color preferences from large, diverse samples of people across the world should refl ect universal trends in colored object valences. We should also note that color preferences may change systematically over time on a scale from weeks to years within individuals and from years to centuries within cultures. Color fashions in the modern clothing industry change seasonally in fairly consistent ways and annually in less predictable ways. Even more dramatic are cultural sea-changes in color preferences that have occurred over periods of decades or longer, such as the ones Pastoureau 24 has documented for blue. Surprisingly, blue was the least favored color in ancient Rome, probably because blue was so prized by their arch-enemies, particularly the Celts and Germans, who painted themselves in blue for battle. Pastoureau posits that blue rose to favor in part via its association with the Virgin Mary within the increasingly dominant Catholic church.
One of the great virtues of the EVT is that all of these factors -universal, cultural, sub-cultural, idiosyncratic, and even dynamic -can potentially be accommodated within its scope. Th at is not to say that it is so amorphous that it fails to make testable predictions: as we will show, numerous tests are possible, not only of its basic predictions across large samples of people, but also of more specifi c predictions that should hold with carefully selected subsets of individuals who share specifi c cultural and even personal experiences.
average color preferences in the united states Th e 32 colors we studied were systematically sampled over the three most salient dimensions of color appearance: hue, saturation, and brightness ( Fig. 8.2 ). We eff ectively based our sampling on the structure of the Natural Color System. 25 We began by choosing highly saturated colors of the four Hering 26 We then defi ned four "cuts" through color space that diff ered in their saturation and lightness levels, as follows. Colors in the "saturated" ( s ) cut were defi ned as the most saturated color of each of the eight hues that could be produced on our monitor. Th e eight colors in the "muted" ( m ) cut were those about halfway between the 1 s color and neutral gray, those in the "light" ( l ) cut were those about halfway between each s color and white, and those in the "dark" ( d ) cut were those about halfway between each s cut and black. Th is set comprised the 32 chromatic colors that were studied. We also included fi ve achromatic (A) colors -white, black, and the three grays whose luminance was the average luminance of the eight hues in the l, m, and d cuts -but we report results just for the 32 chromatic colors in this chapter. Colors within cuts were not constant in saturation or luminance, because we wanted to include highly saturated unique colors, which are not equivalent in either luminance or saturation. Unique yellow and blue, for example, vary dramatically in luminance, with unique saturated yellow being much lighter than unique saturated blue. Forty-eight individuals from the San Francisco Bay area with normal color vision participated in 30 diff erent tasks as part of the Berkeley Color Project. We will discuss only a small subset of these results here: preference ratings of individual colors, ratings of color appearance dimensions ( red-green , blue-yellow , light-dark , and high-low saturation ), and ratings of the three factor-analytic dimensions of color-emotions ( active-passive , heavy-light , and warm-cool ). All ratings were made using a continuous line-mark scale with explicit points at the middle and both ends.
Average preference ratings showed relatively strong eff ects of hue in the s , l , and m colors, producing approximately parallel hue functions with peaks at blue and troughs at chartreuse ( Fig. 8.3 ). s colors were preferred to l and m colors, which did not diff er from each other. Hue and cut did not interact across the s , l , and m cuts, but they did interact for the d cut versus the other three. In particular, darkorange (brown) and dark-yellow (olive) were less preferred than other oranges and yellows, whereas dark-red and dark-green were more preferred than other reds and greens. We used multiple regression techniques to fi t the models from the previously described theories to these data. Th e predictors for the cone-contrast model were computed from the cone contrasts of the 32 tested colors against the gray background, plus CIELUV saturation, as specifi ed by Ling and Hurlbert. 29 Th ese four predictors together accounted for just 37  of the variance in the preference data. Th e three predictors for the color appearance theory (our participants' ratings of red-green , blue-yellow , light-dark , and low-high saturation ) performed better, accounting for 60  of the variance in the preference data. Th e predictors for the color-emotion theory (our participants' ratings of active-passive , heavy-light , and warm-cool ) accounted for 55  of the variance. Clearly, the lower-level conecontrast theory does not fi t as well as the higher-level color-appearance and coloremotion theories, but the latter two are nearly indistinguishable in terms of their ability to account for the data. Next, we attempted to fi t the data using a model from the EVT, but doing so required a much more complex experimental procedure to estimate the relevant predictor variable.
weighted affective valence estimates (waves) of colors Experiment 2 was designed to test the principal assumption of the EVT: that color preferences should largely be predictable from the average valences of people's aff ective reactions to objects with corresponding diagnostic colors. Doing so required us to collect data from three diff erent tasks: object associations, object valence ratings, and color-object match ratings. 
. Color preference ratings are plotted as a function of hue -red (R), orange (O), yellow (Y), chartreuse (H), green (G), cyan (C), blue (B), and purple (P) -for saturated, light, dark, and muted colors.
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Object Association Task
We collected object associations for each of our 37 colors by showing them to a separate group of 74 observers and asking them to describe as many things of that color as they could in 20 seconds. Th ey were asked to describe only things whose colors would be known by most other people from their verbal description.
Responses were eliminated if they (a) could be any color (e.g., crayons, shirts), (b) were abstract concepts instead of objects (e.g., winter, Christmas), (c) were color names instead of objects (e.g., "Cal Blue, " "teal"), (d) were very dissimilar to the presented color (e.g., "grass at noon" for dark purple), or (e) were provided by only a single participant across all colors. Th e remaining descriptions were then categorized to reduce their number. Th ose that were judged to be essentially the same were combined into a single category (e.g., algae included the descriptions "algae, " "algae water, " "algal bloom, " "algae-fi lled fi sh bowl, " and "algae fl oating on top of water"). Th e net result was a list of 222 objects with diagnostic coloration.
Object Valence Ratings
Th e resulting 222 descriptive categories were then shown in black-on-white text to 98 diff erent participants, who were asked to rate the aff ective value of the referent object (i.e., how positive or negative they felt about it) using the same line-mark rating scale as in Experiment 1. Th ese ratings were averaged over participants, resulting in 222 object valence ratings.
Object-Color Match Ratings
Finally, we showed a third independent group of 31 participants each of the 222 object descriptions paired with each of the 32 colors for which it had previously been given as a description, one pair at a time. Participants were asked to rate how well the color of the described object category matched the color on the screen (e.g., strawberries together with a homogeneous square of saturated red) using the same line-mark rating scale. Th e average color-object match ratings were then used to weight the average aff ective valence rating for each object-color pair, such that the valences of the descriptions that better matched the color on the screen were weighted more heavily. We call this measure the "weighted aff ective valence estimate" (WAVE) of the color. Th e fi t of the WAVE to the preference data is impressive, producing a correlation of + 0.89, which accounts for 80  of the variance. Th is level of fi t to the data is considerably better than any of the other three theories tested, even though the WAVE model uses a single predictor variable, rather than the three or four used by the other three theories. Even the WAVE's weighting factor based on the objectcolor match ratings (which is not a free parameter because it is taken directly from the ratings our participants made in this task) is relatively unimportant, because the unweighted average valence ratings are almost as highly correlated with preferences ( r = 0.83) as the WAVEs are. Th e average WAVEs for our 32 chromatic colors are plotted in Figure 8 .4 , which the reader should compare with the average preference ratings shown in Figure 8 .3 . In addition to a better quantitative fi t, the WAVEs also better capture the qualitative structure of the preference functions: the broad, pronounced peak at blue, the trough at chartreuse, higher preference for saturated colors, and the steep global minimum around dark yellow. Its main defi ciencies lie in underpredicting the aversion to dark-orange (largely because chocolate is rated as quite appealing) and under-predicting the positive preference for dark-red (largely because blood is rated as unappealing).
Equally important is the fact that the EVT, from which the WAVE measure was derived, answers the why question: color preferences are caused by average aff ective responses to correspondingly colored objects. Although the present evidence is correlational, we fi nd it unlikely that causation runs in the opposite direction, at least for diagnostically colored objects. It seems unlikely that preferences for these objects are caused by people's color preferences because there are such clear counterexamples. Chocolate and feces, for instance, are quite similar in color but dramatically opposite in valence. Th is should not happen if color preferences caused object preferences. Some third mediating variable could conceivably be at work, but it is unclear what that might be. 
Cultural Commonalities and Diff erences
Critical tests of the EVT will come from cross-cultural studies of color preferences and their relation to corresponding WAVE data. Th e EVT clearly implies that the WAVE data generated by members of one culture will predict that culture's color preferences better than it will predict another culture's color preferences. We are currently working with collaborators in Japan, Mexico, India, and Serbia on collecting both color preference functions and WAVE functions within each culture.
We now have color preference data from Japan and Mexico, but do not yet have their WAVE data.
Sub-cultural Diff erences
Th e EVT also predicts that if people have highly positive (or negative) emotional investments in a social institution that has strong color associations (e.g., an athletic team, gang, religious order, university, or even holiday) they should come to like the associated colors correspondingly more (or less) than the rest of the population, such that there will be a positive correlation between their liking/ disliking of the institution and their liking/disliking of the associated colors. Preliminary results with university colors support this prediction: among students at the University of California, Berkeley, the amount of self-rated school spirit correlates positively with their preference for Berkeley's blue and gold relative to preference for the cardinal red and white colors of Stanford University, an arch-rival institution. Th e opposite pattern of results is found at Stanford. Th ese fi ndings support the prediction that sociocultural infl uences aff ect color preferences to a degree that depends on people's aff ective valence toward the institution. It also provides evidence of the direction of causation because it is wildly improbable that students' choice of and their attitude toward universities are caused by their color preferences: students who like Berkeley do not do so because they like blue and gold; they like blue and gold because they like Berkeley.
Individual Diff erences
Th e same logic described for using culture-specifi c WAVEs to test the EVT's ability to account for culture-specifi c color preferences also holds for any lower-level factors that might also infl uence color preferences. Th us, the EVT provides a theoretical framework for accounting for individual color preferences, provided that the WAVEs of colors can be accurately assessed for individuals. We are currently extending the basic WAVE procedure described above in two ways. One way is to have each observer make his or her own valence ratings of the "standard" set of objects for his or her culture (i.e., the 222 object descriptions compiled from other 
Although the EVT focuses on the eff ects of object preferences on color preferences, we do not claim that color preferences have no infl uence on object preferences. Clearly they do, especially for functionally identical artifacts that come in many colors, such as cars, clothes, appliances, and personal electronics. Widespread (and presumably eff ective) market research on color preferences for specifi c products presupposes that such eff ects exist. Notice, however, that these eff ects too are compatible with the EVT: to the extent that people end up liking something that they bought, made, or chose initially because they liked its color, their preference for that color will be reinforced via positive feedback, provided that they continue to enjoy it. Color preferences will thus tend to be self-perpetuating until other factors, such as boredom, new physical or social circumstances, and/or fashion trends, change the dynamics of aesthetic response, as indeed they inevitably do.
Perhaps the most interesting implication of the EVT is that, if it is true and if there are indeed universal, cultural, sub-cultural, and idiosyncratic infl uences, then the human brain appears at some level to contain a statistical summary of the consequences of one's interactions with colored ecological objects. We did not initially expect this to be the case, because we came into the study expecting that color appearance measures would provide the best predictors. Why else would people like a color than according to how it looks (appears) to them? Although the EVT's fundamental claim (i.e., that implicit statistical knowledge of the outcomes of interactions with colored objects is the basis for color preferences) is retrospectively plausible, it was by no means obvious at the outset. We therefore view it as a genuine discovery that color preferences are largely determined by ecological statistics about the emotional valences of the colored objects one has encountered.
Spatial Composition
Th e second aesthetic domain we are studying is spatial composition. Painters, photographers, graphic designers, and other visual artists who work in twodimensional media continually face the problem of how to position the subjects of their creations in aesthetically pleasing ways within a rectangular frame. We pose the problem like this: How should the to-be-depicted object(s) be situated within Th ere are several ways in which our research on this topic diff ers from the usual tradition in the analysis of art, which is for experts to introspect about their aesthetic reactions to real paintings (e.g., Arnheim 30 and Gombrich
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). First, we collect data about the behavior of other people rather than relying on our own introspections. Th is decision is critical to a scientifi c approach, because behavioral measurements in a well-defi ned task can be confi rmed by others. Second, we rely on the reactions of "average" viewers, rather than a designated elite, such as art critics, museum curators, patrons, and/or the artists themselves, because the elite oft en have very specifi c training about what is (or should be) aesthetically pleasing. Th ird, rather than studying the composition of complex art objects, such as actual paintings, graphic designs, and photographs, we study simple pictures that nobody would claim as art. Real paintings vary from each other in so many ways that it is nearly impossible to determine why aesthetic responses diff er. Using simple, well-controlled visual displays allows us to understand aesthetic response from fi rst principles to get a clear notion of which perceptual factors matter. Below we summarize an extensive series of experiments using a variety of tasks and measurements that reveal several simple, yet robust, compositional biases of average viewers.
horizontal placement of a single object
In the fi rst experiment we will describe, participants performed a constrained adjustment task. 32 Th ey saw pictures of a single object against a minimal background (a black ground-plane and white wall-plane) and were asked to use a computer mouse to drag the object back and forth along the horizontal midline to fi nd the most aesthetically pleasing position. Th ey clicked the mouse when the object was at the best position. Each object was shown in three poses relative to the viewer: facing left ward, facing rightward, and facing forward. We measured the percentage of trials on which the object's center fell into each of seven equal-sized horizontal bins.
Th e results of this experiment are plotted in Figure 8 .5 for the left -, right-, and forward-facing images, averaged over the 10 objects we studied. Large, systematic interactions between facing direction and horizontal position are clearly evident. Forward-facing objects were strongly preferred at or very near the center of the frame, whereas left -facing objects were strongly preferred on the right side of the frame, and right-facing objects were strongly preferred on the left side of the frame. We believe that two strong aesthetic biases are at work: a center bias and an inward bias . 33 Th e center bias alone acts on the forward-facing objects to produce the symmetrical distribution with a clear spike at the center. inward bias seem to operate on the left -and right-facing objects to produce strongly asymmetrical distributions with pronounced maxima on the right and left sides of center, respectively. 34 If the inward bias were operating alone, without the additional infl uence of the center bias, we presume that the most extreme left and right positions would be most preferred for the right-facing and left -facing objects, respectively. By this logic, it seems likely that the center bias is at work for all three facing directions, with the inward bias operating only for the left -and right-facing objects.
We believe that the center bias is essentially due to the structure of the frame itself. Arnheim 35 argued that a square has the "structural skeleton" illustrated in Figure 8 .6A , with a clear singularity at the center. Indeed, his belief in the potency of this position is refl ected in the title of one of his excellent books on spatial composition: Th e Power of the Center . 36 Experimental results by Palmer 37 and Palmer and Guidi 38 using a "goodness of fi t" rating task support the validity of this belief. Th eir results are consistent with rectangles having the structural skeleton shown in Figure 8 .6B , in which the single most potent structural element of the frame is its center, the point at which its vertical and horizontal axes of symmetry intersect. In this sense, the center bias does not depend on any particular knowledge about the object, except the location of the object's own center, which can be computed just from its visually evident contours.
Th e inward bias, however, is object-dependent and knowledge-based because it requires the perceiver to know which side of the object constitutes its front, and this depends on more than just the shape of the object. We do not yet know exactly why it arises. It could be due to the high perceptual salience of the features on the fronts of objects and/or to expected forward motion of objects (although we did not fi nd signifi cant diff erences between objects that were capable of movement and objects that were not when we examined this factor explicitly). Alternatively, it may refl ect asymmetries in the functional aff ordance space around an object. Th e notion of an aff ordance space is derived from J. J. Gibson's 39 notion of aff ordances and specifi es the local area around an object where it typically interacts with humans and other environmental objects. Our untested conjecture is that there is generally a much greater area in front of an object that is of functional interest to 1 an observer than behind it, and no diff erence between the left and right sides, at least for bilaterally symmetrical objects. If so, it is possible that the best location for the diff erent views of the same objects is that for which its aff ordance space, rather than its actual physical extension, is centered in the frame. We have studied aesthetic biases in the horizontal position of single objects in several other ways, 40, 41 including two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) psychophysical methods, free-choice photography of everyday objects (a steam iron, a teapot, and a tape dispenser), and analyses of the positions of objects in singleobject stock photographs from a commercial database (corel.com). All methods show essentially the same eff ects, although to diff erent degrees: We always fi nd a clear center bias for forward-facing objects, and a combination of center and inward biases for left -and right-facing objects. Interestingly, when we looked for the eff ect with novel, letter-like, two-dimensional patterns containing a highly articulated side that we presumed people would see as its front, we did not fi nd evidence of an inward bias.
Framing the frame. (A) Arnheim's diagram of the structural skeleton of a square was derived from his theories. (B) Th is diagram of the structural skeleton of a rectangle is based on data from Palmer and Guidi's empirical studies of goodness of fi t (Palmer & Guidi, in preparation).
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vertical placement of single objects
Another series of experiments examined aesthetic biases in the vertical position of single-object pictures. 42 Th is topic turned out to be somewhat more complex. One set of expected issues related to the role of the horizon and gravitational support in vertical placement. Unlike horizontal placement, there are severe gravitational constraints on where an object can be located vertically relative to a supporting horizontal surface. Unexpectedly, however, we also found eff ects of object-specifi c world knowledge that we term ecological biases : eff ects due to the typical position of the objects relative to human observers. In one experiment we studied vertical preferences in the position of a bowl that was supported by a horizontal surface below it and a light fi xture that was attached to a horizontal surface above it. We independently varied both the vertical position of the object itself and the vertical position of the back edge of the horizontal supporting surface.
Examples of the displays in which the object and horizontal edge coincide are shown in Figure 8 .7 below the graph. Th e solid line and large data points at the top indicate the results for the displays shown directly beneath them; the other lines and points show the corresponding data for displays in which the horizontal edge was above the bowl or below the light fi xture. Two facts are particularly noteworthy. One is that the most preferred position of the horizontal edge is always at the same height as the object. Displacing the horizontal edge so that it was above the bowl or below the light fi xture caused preference to decrease monotonically as distance increased. Th is result may occur because when the object is at the same height as the horizon edge, the object occludes (covers) part of the edge and therefore most clearly indicates that the object is closer than the horizontal edge.
Evidence of ecological biases comes from a clear lower bias for the bowl and an equally clear, and almost exactly opposite, upper bias for the light fi xture. Th is pattern of results for vertical position is so similar to the center and inward biases for horizontal position of left -and right facing objects that we currently believe them to be, in eff ect, corresponding phenomena in the vertical dimension. Th e bowl and light fi xture do not have a "front" and "back" in the vertical dimension, of course, but it is easy to see by analogy that the top of the bowl and the bottom of the light fi xture are their most salient functional parts. Indeed, if one were to draw their "aff ordance spaces, " it seems likely that the bowl's would extend much further upward than downward and that the light fi xture's would extend much further downward than upward. Th is asymmetry is virtually guaranteed by the fact that these objects are attached to support planes below and above them, respectively. Th us, we believe that these compositional biases in the vertical dimension may be analogous to those in the horizontal dimension. Th ere are further uncertainties about the interpretation of these vertical biases, however. Th ey might also be due to a perspective bias , since the bowl is depicted from slightly above, so that its upper lip is visible, and the light fi xture is shown from slightly below, so that its bottom is visible. Perhaps people like objects viewed from above to be lower in the frame and objects viewed from below to be higher in the frame. Such a perspective bias would provide redundant information about the viewpoint from which the object is being viewed, such that its preferred position correlates (negatively) with the perspective from which it is depicted (i.e., higher perspective views positioned lower in the frame and lower perspective views higher in the frame). Another potential factor is an ecological bias . Viewers might prefer the bowl to be low (and the light fi xture high) in the frame because bowls are generally below (and light fi xtures generally above) our vantage point. We conducted further experiments to test these possibilities. 
Ecological Biases in Vertical Position
One problem with the bowl and the light fi xture is that, when they are supported in the usual way (by a plane below and above them, respectively), they are not visible from certain viewpoints: the bowl is not visible from below its horizontal surface of support, nor the light fi xture from above. We eliminated this problem in the next experiment by using pictures of objects that could, in principle, be seen from any viewpoint. For an object that is typically positioned above human viewers we chose a fl ying eagle, and for an object that is typically positioned below human viewers, we chose a swimming stingray. If the vertical position eff ects in the previous experiment are due to perspective eff ects, then we should see corresponding biases with both the eagle and stingray: when either object is viewed from above (as the bowl was), there should be a lower bias for both, and when it is viewed from below (as the light fi xture was), there should be an upper bias for both. If the vertical position eff ects are due to ecological height, however, the fl ying eagle should produce an upper bias for all views because it is generally located above human viewers, and the stingray should produce a lower bias for all views because it is generally located below human viewers. It is important to note that these factors are not mutually exclusive: both perspective and ecological eff ects might operate at the same time, in which case some combination of the two patterns should occur together. Th e other conditions we included in this study were designed to look for an analogue of the striking center bias we found in the fi rst experiment we described about horizontal placement. When symmetrical objects were facing directly forward, people preferred them in the center of the frame. For the eagle and the stingray, we therefore included views from directly above and directly below to test for the existence of a corresponding vertical center bias.
We expected the results for the directly above and directly below conditions to produce a symmetrical center bias. Th e data, shown in Figures 8.8A and C for the eagle and 8.8B and D for the stingray, show a broad center bias, presumably due to the symmetry of the projections of these objects (and/or their aff ordance spaces) as viewed from directly above and below. However, it is an asymmetrical center bias, in which the eagle also exhibits a distinct upper bias and the stingray a somewhat less pronounced lower bias. Th ese asymmetries are consistent with an ecological bias, because fl ying eagles are above earthbound observers, and swimming stingrays are below them. It is not consistent with a perspective bias, however, which implies that the eagle from directly below should exhibit an upper bias (which it does), whereas an eagle from directly above should exhibit a lower bias (which it does not), and vice versa for the stingray. It is worth mentioning that independent groups of observers saw the eagle pictures and the stingray pictures, because this fact eliminates the possibility that observers were responding to a "demand characteristic" of the experiment that might have arisen if the same observers had seen both the eagle and the stingray pictures. Th e results for the side views reveal stronger ecological biases. Both side views of the eagle exhibit a strong upper bias, presumably because fl ying eagles are generally above us in the environment, whereas both views of the swimming stingray exhibit a lower bias that is almost as strong, presumably because stingrays are generally below us in the environment. Notice, however, that there is also a smaller, but consistent, perspective bias: the upper bias for the eagle is stronger for the side-below view than for the side-above view, and the lower bias for the stingray is 1 stronger for the side-above view than for the side-below view. Th ese patterns are just what would be expected from a perspective bias: objects seen from below are preferred to be higher in the frame and objects seen from above to be lower in the frame. Th ese biases are analogous to the inward-facing bias we found in horizontal compositions, except that here they are combined with a strong ecological height bias.
other ecological biases
Ecological biases imply that people prefer pictures of a focal object in which its known spatial characteristics within the environment are consistent with corresponding spatial characteristics of their depicted two-dimensional framed images. Such eff ects are not restricted to height within the frame, however, as we will now consider for the domains of ecological perspective, size, and orientation. Previous research by Palmer, Rosch, and Chase 43 on perspective eff ects in object perception identifi ed a phenomenon that they called canonical perspective : certain views of objects are systematically rated as "better" pictures of the object in the sense that some perspective views "look more like the depicted object" than others. Palmer and colleagues showed that the better (more canonical) perspective views allowed the depicted object to be more quickly recognized and that people more oft en reported imagining the object from more canonical perspectives. Figure 8. 9A , for example, shows the "best" perspective views of 4 of the 12 objects Palmer and colleagues studied in terms of having the highest ratings among the nine perspective views they studied. Figure 8 .9B shows several perspective views of the horse that vary from best (left ) to worst (right).
More recently Khalil and McBeath 44 reported the results of a study in which they explicitly asked their participants to rate their aesthetic judgments of diff erent perspective views. Th ese aesthetic preferences generally corresponded well with the results reported by Palmer, Rosch, and Chase. 45 Ecological perspective biases associated with canonical perspective thus refl ect another way in which people's aesthetic preferences reveal implicit knowledge about objects in the world: people like pictures of objects that make them most recognizable by showing their most informative parts and interrelations.
Recent research by Konkle and Oliva 46 has made a corresponding case for a phenomenon in the size domain that they call canonical size . Certain sizes of twodimensional framed images of objects are rated as better depictions, are better recognized, and are more frequently drawn than other image sizes within the same rectangular frame. Moreover, these sizes are systematically related to the relative sizes of the objects: the "best" picture of an elephant, for example, is bigger than the "best" picture of a mouse, and the optimal size of the object relative to the frame is a function of the logarithm of the object's actual size. Linsen, Leyssen, Gardner, and Palmer 47 found similar results in people's choices of the most aesthetically pleasing picture of objects at diff erent sizes.
Another ecological bias that is perhaps so obvious that it scarcely seems worth mentioning is canonical orientation. Many, if not most, real-world objects have canonical orientations within the environment -their "upright" orientationsthat are dictated largely by gravitational stability and functional constraints. Dogs, chairs, cars, trees, and people are among the multitude of commonplace objects that have clear canonical orientations. Such objects are most easily recognized in their canonical upright orientations, and, roughly speaking, larger deviations from upright lead to more diffi culty in recognizing them. 48 Although we know of no aesthetic research that has specifi cally addressed this question, it is intuitively obvious that most people will fi nd pictures of such objects most aesthetically pleasing when they are depicted in their canonical, upright orientations.
Th e center bias excepted, all of these biases in spatial composition -the inward bias, the perspective height bias, and ecological biases in position, perspective, size, and orientation -depend strongly, but implicitly, on statistical knowledge about the properties of the depicted object. Th e inward bias, for example, depends on the observer knowing that the object has a distinguished front and a back, and prefers the front to be closer to the center. Ecological biases in position are based on knowing where objects are typically located relative to human observers; ecological perspective biases depend on observers knowing which surfaces of objects are most informative; and ecological size biases depend on the observer knowing how big objects are. In each case, people tend to prefer pictures in which their knowledge of these object properties is refl ected in corresponding properties of its image within the picture frame. Perhaps the most obvious explanation is that the biases we fi nd result from "mere exposure" eff ects: 49 people might prefer images with such compositions simply because they have seen more pictures composed in these ways than in other ways. Th e problem with this account is that, by itself, it suff ers from infi nite regress and thus fails to answer the why question. You might prefer the compositions that you have seen most frequently in the past, but why did the people who created those images use those compositions? Th e mere-exposure explanation requires that the bias was caused by those people preferring the compositions that they saw most frequently in their viewing histories. But why did they prefer those compositions they did? Th e obvious problem is that the mere-exposure explanation thus must be applied endlessly, always appealing to what the previous generation of image creators experienced most frequently and never "cashing out" the explanation in terms other than frequency-of-viewing histories. Th is is not to say that mere exposure has no eff ect on aesthetic preferences -see Cutting 50 for an interesting analysis of its impact on the canon of Impressionist paintings -but only that its explanatory value in answering the why question is limited to preserving a status quo that arose for some reason other than frequency-of-viewing histories.
Th e fl uency theory of aesthetic preference, as outlined by Reber (Chapter 9 of this volume) and colleagues (e.g., Winkielman 51 ), provides a far more satisfactory account. Its basic claim is that any factor that allows a picture to be perceived more easily (or "fl uently") enhances a viewer's aesthetic experience. Standard examples of fl uency concern context-free image properties, such as having high degrees of clarity, fi gure-ground contrast, symmetry, and exposure frequency, all of which should make them easier to perceive, independent of their specifi c content. (Notice that although a fl uency account includes exposure frequency as a factor, it actually explains exposure eff ects by appealing to their infl uence on how easily people can perceive the current exposure rather than simply appealing to the person's exposure history itself.) Th e aesthetic biases discussed above are diff erent from such basic fl uency factors because the former are context-specifi c and depend importantly on specifi c knowledge about the kinds of object depicted in the image. Nevertheless, most of the biases we have discussed above are consistent with a fl uency account because they all plausibly increase the ease with which the depicted object can be perceived and/or identifi ed within the picture. Th e center bias locates the object at or near the center, where it is least susceptible to lateral masking and crowding eff ects arising from the borders. Th e inward bias puts the object in a location where its most important side (front, top, or bottom) is closest to the center and thus is most easily perceptible. Th e various forms of ecological biases place the object in a relation to the frame that is most consistent with our knowledge about the object's likely location, perspective, size, and orientation in the environment, so that its most informative parts, its typical size, and its typical position relative to a human observer are optimally represented when viewing the picture. Indeed, canonical perspective 52 and, more recently, vertical position relative to the observer 53 have already been shown to facilitate identifi cation performance. Even so, we are not convinced that fl uency theory provides a full and satisfying explanation of aesthetic response. Th e problem we see is that it is pitched at too low a level to explain many important aesthetic eff ects. It seems well equipped to explain the compositional eff ects we have just presented, which are relevant to understanding the aesthetic appeal of, say, high-quality stock photography or National Geographic images, in which the presumed intent is to create an image that depicts a particular object optimally. However, it seems problematic in dealing with the aesthetic appeal of less standard images in which there is some more complex perceptual, cognitive, and/or emotional message behind the image. Our view is that the compositional biases we have discussed thus far are essentially default preferences that apply when the conveyed meaning is essentially just the default message: "Th is is a picture of X, " where X is the appropriate category of the portrayed object or situation. Under these conditions, optimality presumably means that the depiction is the most easily (or fl uently) perceived image of that object or situation, and it is reasonable to suppose that it would be composed so that the focal object would tend to be centered, to be facing inward, and to refl ect whatever ecological information is most relevant.
Nevertheless, there is oft en some deeper, less obvious, yet more important message that an image is intended to convey -or that it simply does convey to a particular viewer at a particular time, regardless of the creator's intentions. Such messages are oft en poorly served by adhering to default aesthetic biases such as the ones we have just described. A good example is shown in Figure 8 .10 . Nature's Writing is a striking photographic image by Jean-Paul Bourdier from his book Bodyscapes , in which he composes the female body within the frame so that it violates several default biases -including the center and inward biases both horizontally and vertically as well as ecological biases toward canonical perspective, orientation, and color -in ways that serve to convey the message that people's bodies are an integral part of the natural world and that even the boundaries between us and our environment are unclear and permeable. Clearly, a stock photograph of a woman standing on a sandy landscape would fail to convey such complex and subtle meaning.
Rather than trying to stretch the admittedly elastic concept of fl uency to cover cases in which expectations have been violated in ways that create such obvious disfl uency, we prefer to conceptualize aesthetic considerations in spatial composition in terms of what we have called "representational fi t. " 54 ("Fit" alone might be the more general and appropriate term, since "representational fi t" is presumably relevant only to visual objects that qualify as representations, such as pictures or representational paintings.) Th e idea behind the "fi t" hypothesis is that the aesthetic value of an image will vary with the extent to which the spatial composition of the image successfully conveys a meaningful message to a viewer. Th e content of this message might be sensory, cognitive, emotional, or any combination of these; ideally, it would encompass all of them together. It might be what the artist had in mind while creating the image or it might not, as viewers oft en generate meanings of their own when viewing such images. Within the "representational fi t" framework, there is an eff ective default message, which is simply that the intent of the picture is to portray the object, scene, or situation it depicts in a perceptually optimal way. We take this to be the eff ective message of a stock photograph, for example, and it may be true, as fl uency theorists propose, that under such an interpretation, the image is more aesthetically appealing to the degree that it is more easily perceived as that object, scene, or situation. But there are many more complex, meaningful, and emotional messages that an image can convey, and they are oft en carried at least in part by defying default aesthetic expectations, such as the center, inward, perspective, and the various ecological biases in spatial composition.
representational fit and violating compositional biases
To investigate this issue, we have begun to study how compositional preferences can be infl uenced by conceptual content. We do so by giving the same set of compositionally manipulated images diff erent titles (meanings) and asking people to figure 8. shows fi ve compositions of the same racehorse against a uniformly motionsmeared background in which only the position of the racehorse varies. To manipulate the message, we gave the images three diff erent titles. Th e default title was simply "Racehorse. " Here we expected that the center and inward biases we found in our earlier studies would hold. We also used two titles that biased the composition in diff erent and opposite ways. "Front Runner" was expected to bias the composition toward positions in which horse was, in eff ect, running out of the picture because the empty space behind it implies that it is far ahead of its (unseen) competition. "Dead Last" was expected to bias the composition toward positions in which horse was, in eff ect, running into the picture because the empty space ahead of it implies that it is far behind its (unseen) competition. Similar kinds of title manipulations were used with other images that implied the presence of other unseen objects either behind or in front of the depicted object (e.g., chasing versus being chased). Another set of images were based on a temporal metaphor in which empty space in the image could be seen as consistent with interpretations emphasizing diff erent parts of a journey: for example, a man walking with the titles "Man Walking" (default), "Journey's End" (biasing images of him walking out of the frame), and "Starting Out" (biasing images of him walking into the frame).
In this experiment, the intended message of the images was provided by the title in the context of a brief cover story, in which participants were told to imagine 1 that they were artists, who had decided on the title and the object for an image, and were now trying to decide on the composition of the image within a rectangular frame. Th ey then ranked all the horizontal compositions for that title from most to least aesthetically pleasing. Th e results, plotted in Figure 8 .11 , show a very clear pattern that is consistent with our predictions. Th e default titles yielded aesthetic preferences like those we found in our previous experiments for facing objects: a clear center bias with an inward-facing asymmetry, peaking at the position in which the depicted object was close to the center, yet also clearly facing into the frame. Th e titles that biased non-standard interpretations, however, produced strikingly diff erent preference functions. When the title promoted the idea that the depicted object was ahead of other implied objects or was at the end of a journey, the preference curve peaked at the two positions where it faced most clearly out of the frame. When the title promoted the idea that the depicted object was behind other implied objects or was at the start of a journey, however, the preference curve peaked at the two positions where it faced most clearly into the frame. We interpret these results as supporting our notion that default compositional biases can be overridden by violations that fi t (i.e., are consistent with) the message implied by the title. Th e aesthetic response to an image will thus be greatest when its spatial composition eff ectively conveys (fi ts) the message defi ned by the title it was given. It is possible that the results can also be interpreted as supporting a revised and expanded fl uency account (see Chapter 9) . Th e trick is to reinterpret the original notion that fl uency refl ects ease in perception of the focal object to encompass ease in some particular conceptual interpretation . Th e racehorse running out of the frame may not be the most easily perceived image of a racehorse, for example, but it might well be the easiest image to perceive as a front-running racehorse, where the additional conceptual content implies that the horse is ahead of the competition. Th e reason the two theoretical frameworks are consistent with each other is that a good fi t between the title's meaning and the image should facilitate (make fl uent) the apprehension of that meaning.
One problem that arises for fl uency theories of aesthetics is that, despite its apparent fl exibility, some kinds of expectancy violations necessarily make the image less, rather than more, fl uently perceived or conceived by any reasonable understanding of fl uency. Most problematic are cases in which the artist intentionally creates an image that is diffi cult to perceive and/or understand. Much of modern art, at least from Cubism on, poses challenges of this sort. It is even evident in the Nature's Writing image reproduced in Figure 8 .10 . Certainly part of the point of this image is to make the viewer scrutinize it carefully to try to fi nd out what, if anything, is present in the picture other than a series of mounds of reddish earth. It is quite implausible, we think, to claim that its aesthetic value hinges on fl uency of any reasonable sort. Th e most plausible argument would be that it is aesthetically pleasing because it is fl uently perceived as disfl uent. We fi nd this move to be a perversion, if not an outright contradiction, of fl uency theory. 
Conjectures and Conclusions
When we began our studies of aesthetic response to visual displays, we naïvely expected that the underlying principles would be essentially knowledge-free. We thought, for example, that people's average color preferences would be largely explicable in terms of color appearances (i.e., the coordinates of colors in some appropriately structured color space) and that people's compositional preferences would be largely, if not completely, explicable in terms of the relation between objects and the structural skeleton of its rectangular frame (e.g., Arnheim 55 ). In both cases, however, the results we obtained led us to a surprising conclusion: implicit knowledge of environmental objects and their relations to us appears to be absolutely central to people's aesthetic response in both domains. We initially avoided studying the aesthetic eff ects of specifi c content (i.e., the nature of the focal objects in a picture or scene) because we expected such considerations to involve strong, self-evident knowledge-based eff ects that would be diffi cult to study: people would like pictures of objects/scenes/situations that they liked for reasons quite independent of the picture's composition. Even when the displays consist of single colors or spatial compositions of the very same object in the very same pose, however, we are fi nding strong, and not particularly self-evident, eff ects of specifi c world knowledge. In the color domain, average preferences appear to refl ect the statistics of how much people, in general, like the objects that are characteristically those colors. In the spatial domain, they appear to depend on people's knowledge of the salient characteristics of the objects depicted and how they relate to the observer. Now that we have established that statistical world knowledge is relevant to aesthetic response, there is the deeper question of why this might be so. For the case of color, the EVT provides a plausible answer: preferences perform an adaptive "steering" function, biasing sighted observers to approach objects that are likely to be benefi cial and to avoid objects that are not. Th is explanation is satisfying from an adaptive, evolutionary perspective because acting in accord with such aesthetic preferences would be benefi cial for the organism to the extent that the preferences are correlated with (i.e., carry predictive information about) what is "good" versus "bad" for the observer.
It is not so obvious what adaptive function might be served by the spatial compositional eff ects we have found: the center bias, the inward bias, and the various ecological biases. A central problem for any adaptive theory of these biases is that they all apply to framed representational visual displays that did not exist when humankind was presumably being shaped by evolution. Even in modern times, the composition of static, rectangular, framed images seem to be largely irrelevant to people's lives, at least outside the world of art, websites, and wall decorations. To be more generally relevant, the domain to which these principles apply would have to be broadened to include other, more adaptive decisions and behaviors. One intriguing possibility is that the compositional biases we have found may be related to optimal eye fi xations. People make thousands of eye movements every day, the purpose of which is to bring various ecological objects into view so that we can see them clearly and identify them effi ciently. Perhaps the aesthetic eff ects we fi nd in spatial composition are rooted in principles that people would use to optimize eye fi xations.
Th e general idea is that if the composition of an image within a rectangular frame is conceived as roughly analogous to the position of objects within the visual fi eld, it would be adaptive for people to make fi xations that make the most important information about the relevant objects most available in the image. Th e center bias would be related to the strong foveation of retinal receptors and the cortical magnifi cation of information at or near the central area of the visual fi eld. Th e inward and perspective biases would similarly be related to putting the most important and informative parts of the focal objects at or near the foveal region. Ecological biases would be related to providing proximal image features that are consistent with distal object features, depicting small things as small in the frame, large things as large in the frame, high things as high in the frame, and low things as low in the frame.
Th ere are diff erences between rectangular frames and the fi eld of vision, to be sure. One is that the frame of a picture is explicitly visible whereas the boundary of the visual fi eld is not, being defi ned merely by the absence of sensory input. Another is that the shape of the visual fi eld is oval rather than rectangular. But, such relatively minor diff erences aside, the eye-fi xation hypothesis provides a plausible, ecologically relevant rationale for why people might have these kinds of default biases.
Th e notion that these default expectations can be violated when some meaning other than the nature of the object or situation is foregrounded becomes analogous to an observer who is making eye fi xations with some meaningful expectation about what the scene will contain. If the observer expects to see a front-running racehorse, then the best fi xation might be behind the horse to look for the competition, whereas if the observer expects to see a racehorse that is dead last, the best fi xation might be in front of the horse for an analogous reason. Th ese ideas are mere hypotheses at this point, of course, but that is always precisely the starting point for the next round of experimental testing. Th ey at least have the virtue of making a bridge between our aesthetic eff ects and adaptive properties of real-world perception.
We began by briefl y outlining our conception of aesthetic science. We then went on to show that aesthetic response to both colors and spatial compositions is infl uenced by hidden knowledge about the observed colors and objects. We off er the research we have described essentially as an existence proof that scientifi c approaches to aesthetic questions are useful and productive. We freely acknowledge that our results to date have raised more questions than they have answered, but this is not at all uncommon in science, especially in the initial stages of investigating 
